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Abstract:
What is the nature of presidential power? What are its limits, and what recognizable forms does it
take? These were the questions the late Richard Neustadt attempted to answer in his seminal work
Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents. Neustadt’s prescience and the eloquence he
brought to discussions of the presidency inform much of the contemporary literature on the subject.
That said, his book was published at a decidedly different moment in American politics,
necessitating a reevaluation of many of his core arguments. This paper explores the modern
presidential-congressional dynamic, focusing on the development of the legislative presidency and
how presidents attempt to push forward their legislative agenda. Neustadt’s insights will be applied
to two recent case studies to shed light on the extent to which his model of presidential power is still
applicable in the modern age.
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The Presidency and Congress in Context: A History, the Role of Political Science, and
Richard Neustadt

On the 35th day of the partial government shutdown, President Donald Trump finally
relented. The weeks preceding the President’s signing of a measure to reopen the government on
January 25, 2019, were marred by the sort of caustic interbranch conflict that has become
symptomatic of our current body politic. While the President railed against the newly minted
Democratic House majority in his efforts to secure funds for his coveted border wall, Speaker
Nancy Pelosi held firm, jealously guarding the legislative branch’s power of the purse. In the end,
the President’s hand was forced in part by anxious members of his own party, in addition to a united
opposition. The partial shutdown had manifested in numerous furloughs for those working at the
nation’s airports, national parks, FBI and IRS offices, as well as over 1 million federal employees and
contractors.1 President Trump’s approval numbers suffered as the shutdown continued, and it
became increasingly clear to Trump’s aides that the White House could no longer afford to keep the
standoff going.2
The President cut a disconsolate figure as he stood alone in his Rose Garden address to the
press the morning of January 25th. The deal struck with Congressional leadership contained no new
funding for a border wall, but it marked the conclusion of a policy debate that had burgeoned into
the longest government shutdown in United States’ history.3 President Trump had unequivocally
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failed in his attempts to direct the nation’s agenda through traditional channels, to convince his
fellow lawmakers on Capitol Hill that it was in their best interests to address the alleged crisis on the
Southern border in the manner he favored. Congress remained unmoved, and the final agreement
was nearly identical to the deal Congressional Republicans initially endorsed—and Trump
rebuffed—only five weeks earlier.4
This episode is but a flashpoint in one of the most enduring rivalries in American
government: that between the presidency and Congress. Their combative relationship is tradition,
rooted in the theoretical underpinnings of our nation's founding documents. The Constitution
provides for three separate branches of government, yet intrinsically links their responsibilities in an
effort to induce conflict and the sharing of authority.5 James Madison famously suggested that the
combination of powers in any one institution would be “the very definition of tyranny,” and so
mutual checking and monitoring among the branches of government was encouraged to suppress
the accumulation of influence.6 Take for instance the federal budgeting process. As president,
Donald Trump is empowered by expectation and custom to deliver a draft budget to Congress, and
it is his prerogative whether to sign or veto the appropriations legislation presented to him. The
power to actually authorize and appropriate the necessary funds for the president’s initiatives
ultimately lies with Congress.7
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Little at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 provoked more debate than the shape and
scope of executive authority vis-à-vis the legislative branch.8 How can a government effectively
distribute power among independent institutions so as to protect against self-interested behavior,
while simultaneously providing for energetic, centralized leadership? The president was originally
tasked with performing only a handful of legislative duties within the separation-of-powers system.
In authorizing the chief executive to report on the State of the Union, recommend necessary and
expedient legislation, convene the legislature in extraordinary circumstances, and exercise a qualified
veto over bills and joint resolutions passed by Congress, the framers sought to create an office that
would prod and check legislative power rather than usurp it.9
The structure of presidential authority devised by the Founding Fathers in Article II
amounted to little more than an imprecise blueprint, intended to be expounded on and codified
through practice.10 Indeed, evidence suggests that James Madison intended Congress to be first among
equals in the legislative-executive relationship, rather than the president. Whereas Article I of the
Constitution enumerates the purview of the legislative branch in great detail, Article II is
comparatively brief and indeterminate. This disparity is indicative of prevailing American sentiment
at the time of ratification; the country was still recuperating from a revolution sparked by
deep-seated resentment of strong executive power. In the words of then-Virginia Governor
Edmund Randolph, a lone executive was feared to be “the foetus of monarchy.”11 Consequently, the
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framers sought to create a nebulous institution with inherent weaknesses to mitigate the potential for
tyrannical governance.
How might Donald Trump have increased the chances of Congress adopting a budget that
reflected his administration's values and policy goals, given the weaknesses inherent in his office, and
the perennial conflict between the presidency and the legislative branch? It is by no means an easy
task. Save for the broad delegations of authority granted to the executive branch in the realm of
foreign affairs, every president is fundamentally constrained by the Constitutional framework under
which they operate. The prominence of the office compounds the issues presidents face in
exercising their influence—as our national spokesperson, the personification of our nation, and the
closest thing we have to a royal sovereign, the public expects and the president must deliver.12 It falls
to political scientists to identify the necessary conditions and variables that allow presidents to
overcome the barriers implicit in our separation of powers system.
The American Presidency represents one of the most enigmatic subfields of political science,
in part due to the limitations of quantitative analysis that a study of the presidency entails. Beyond
the realm of public opinion and strategic use of the veto, institutional theorists studying the
presidency have a relatively modest sample size from which conclusions may be drawn. There have
been only 45 presidents, which precludes the sort of longitudinal, quantitative analytical studies that
typify work on Congress and the federal judiciary. As a consequence, the literature is vague when it
comes to conceptualizing presidential power and its associated variables.13
Not until Richard Neustadt did a scholar effectively articulate the essence of presidential
power. His research set the paradigm, and now represents the North Star against which all
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subsequent works on the presidency are judged. Neustadt’s insights were shaped through decades of
experience in and around the White House. As special adviser to Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and
Johnson, he was well-placed to take stock of the specific practices of different administrations, to
look lucidly on what bolstered and what reduced presidential influence. From this vantage point,
Neustadt formulated a well-defined hypothesis. He concluded that presidential power is the power
to persuade, and a president’s stakes in persuading are conditioned by his vantage point in
government, his professional reputation, and public prestige.14 These ideas constitute the lens
through which Neustadt views various historical examples in his book Presidential Power.
In many respects, Neustadt was ahead of his time in understanding the chief executive in
particular and the processes of American government more broadly. He judged that rather than our
government being based in the separation of powers, ours can be characterized as a system of
“separated institutions sharing power.”15 With respect to the legislative branch, the formal powers of
Congress and the President are so intertwined, neither will accomplish very much, for very long,
without the acquiescence of the other. The essence of a President’s task thus becomes to “convince
[other government actors] that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for
their sake and on their authority.”16 In other words, presidents call on their powers of persuasion to
effectuate change, by inducing an alignment of White House policy goals with those of other
government officials.
Though Neustadt's work encompassed far more than the interbranch dynamic between
Congress and the chief executive, his model of presidential power can be best understood in the
context of the legislative presidency, and how presidents relate to their counterparts on Capitol Hill.
Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 150.
Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern American Presidents (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 29.
16
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It is beyond doubt that the president has always had a legislative role, but the advancement of the
legislative presidency itself is a far more recent development. The term “legislative presidency” here
refers to the general growth of the chief executive’s capacity to influence public policy, and the
means by which presidents have inserted themselves into the legislative process in profound and
lasting ways.17 This is no trivial development: American government is purported to be composed of
three coequal branches, yet it is beyond dispute that the modern president has emerged as the de
facto first among equals. Presidential activism has become the norm over the past 90 years, in spite
of institutions built for the express purpose of protecting against the concentration of power.
Indeed, much has changed since Neustadt’s seminal work was published in 1960. The
current thrust of American politics and the hyper-partisan tide that has engulfed Washington
necessitate a reevaluation of many of his core arguments. Though Neustadt may very well have
touched on some immutable truths every president must contend with, the political climate that
colored his conception of presidential power more than half a century ago was markedly different
from that under which presidents must currently operate. Were he alive today, Neustadt would likely
cede this point; he is explicit in characterizing the “mid-century period” in which his reflections took
place as being marked by the weakening of party ties, an emphasis on personality, the existential and
unifying threat of the Soviet Union, the changeability of public moods, and ticket splitting.18 Only
some of these qualities endure.
The dual concerns of cultivating professional reputation and public prestige certainly seem
to be non-factors for President Donald Trump, an individual with a known penchant for going his
own way and employing unorthodox methods. Indeed, in the absence of a cooperative legislature,
17
18
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the past couple administrations would appear to have spurned Neustadtian bargaining in favor of
unilateral action or public appeals. This raises pertinent questions about the nature of the legislative
presidency in the modern era. Likewise, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: does
Neustadt’s model of presidential power still hold up today? Do presidents stand any chance of
accomplishing their legislative aims through the means Neustadt and his contemporaries identified,
and if not, how can we reconceptualize the true nature of presidential power?

Presidential Power Reconsidered: Methods and the Literature

Limitations in the study of the presidency dictate the structure this paper will follow. As
previously noted, there is a dearth of quantitative presidential studies, in large part because there
have been so few presidents. Ultimately, political science is a numbers game, and many scholars have
tried to mathematize studies of the presidency. The drawback to this approach is that the resulting
models often depict a world where there are no transaction costs, where the institutions of
government are monoliths devoid of collective action problems, and where the preferences and
moves of all players are common knowledge. These quantitative models focus on the strategic
environment in which the president governs, but not the man himself.
The qualitative approach is useful in that it fills in these sorts of gaps. The emphasis on
personality and background tells us a lot about an individual president’s capacity to effectuate
change, and so our exploration of presidential power will not attempt to quantify what is by nature
ephemeral. This paper will consider via case study analysis the efforts of Presidents Obama and
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Trump in pushing through the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the American
Health Care Act, respectively.
These bills were enacted at similar points in each president’s first term, both under
conditions of unified partisan government. Both pieces of legislation dealt with the same,
contentious domestic policy issue as well. The case study section of this paper will function primarily
as a means of applying a contemporary critique to Neustadt’s work. Analyzing the strategies these
recent presidents employed in forcing the hand of Congress, and what each got for their efforts, will
go a long way toward elucidating the precise nature of presidential power in the modern age.

Power vs. Powers

In order to narrow the scope of our discussion, the first distinction that must be drawn from
the relevant literature is the difference between power and powers. Pursuant to the paradigm set by
Neustadt, much of the recent presidential literature’s analytic focus centers on the persuasive, mostly
personal powers of the presidency—the ability of presidents to bargain with members of Congress
and solicit compliance from other governmental actors.19 Power i n this sense refers to the individual’s
influence: what a president can do to get his way within a pluralistic system populated by others
equally anxious to exercise their own influence.20 Conversely, powers are those designations of
authority to the president by the Constitution, federal statute, or custom.21 The two are inextricably
linked, as a president's powers prescribe the terms under which they can exercise power.
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Academics from an array of disciplines have attempted to describe the current state of
presidential influence with regards to Congress, many conflating power with powers. Though legal
scholars and political scientists may stand apart, the research of each often informs the work of the
other. Law and politics are hard to separate and lie on a continuum, but the poles are clear enough
that an understanding of the de facto and de jure aspects of presidential power can be neatly drawn up.
22
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23

Most subsequent works on the presidency do not suffer from this discrepancy, in large part

because of the clear distinctions identified by Neustadt.
Presidential involvement in the legislative process is a natural consequence of the chief
executive’s constitutionally enshrined lawmaking authority. The presidency was granted the capacity
to stimulate the exercise of Congress’ legislative prerogatives through recommendations, and to
constrain or even negate it by his veto, but not to assume it by virtue of any inherent or implied
executive or legislative power.24 This interpretation has evolved as recent presidents have taken a
more expansive view of Article II to issue Executive Orders, but the fact remains that the president's
Constitutional lawmaking powers are mostly negative—designed to counteract but not to preempt
the actions of the legislature. Indeed, reliance on formal powers signals weakness according to
Neustadt and many of his contemporaries. These scholars profess that what distinguishes great
presidents is not a willingness to exercise their formal powers, but the ability to gather support
precisely when such powers are lacking.25
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Neustadt believed that powers a re no guarantee of power; that despite the president’s status in
government, he cannot secure acquiescence without argument.26 Engaging with Congress to push
through legislation is an uncertain course of action, because the institution is notoriously unwieldy
and rife with collective action problems. Yet the prospect of achieving a lasting policy outcome
provides incentives to which presidents invariably respond. Power t hus defined is not a formal,
Constitutional position, but rather an informal lobbying role, one that Theodore Roosevelt and
Woodrow Wilson pioneered, and all presidents since Franklin Roosevelt have implemented.27 It can
be understood as “influence of an effective sort on the behavior of men actually involved in making
public policy and carrying it out.”28 This paper will consider power through this lens, rather than
focusing on the trappings of Constitutional and statutory jurisprudence as it pertains to the chief
executive.

Bargaining vs. Other Means of Influence

There appears to be a broad consensus amongst those who study the presidency on the base
reason presidents exercise power in the first place. To the extent a president is “powerful,” he is
better able to dictate the content of public policy. This form of influence is the end goal of power,
but the means remain a source of contention. What recognizable shape does presidential power take
in practice? On this point Neustadt was explicit: the power to persuade is the power to bargain, and
the president’s status and authority yield bargaining advantages.29 The president’s services are in
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demand all over Washington; with respect to the legislative branch, members of Congress need an
agenda from outside, a plan with visibility and status to rage against or defend.30 A president wishing
to succeed should therefore tread carefully, as his choices of what he should say and do, and how
and when, are his means to enhance his bargaining stakes.31 What a president does today shapes
assessments of capacity going forward.
Others concur with Neustadt, though they differ in their appraisals of which factor most
augments a president’s advantages in bargaining. George Edwards initially pointed to public prestige
as the greatest source of presidential influence.32 Broad public support for the chief executive’s
policy initiatives is thought to be the first step in presidential attempts to influence Congressional
deliberation, because the higher the public's level of approval, the more support the president’s
programs will receive from members of Congress.33 Nevertheless, Edwards’ later reflections make
clear that although presidents sometimes are able to maintain public support for themselves and
their policies, they typically do not succeed in efforts to fundamentally alter public opinion.34
More contemporary scholars have emphasized the role that partisan division plays in
presidential bargaining, viewing divided government as either promoting or precluding negotiation
entirely. As Congress has coalesced into two warring camps over recent decades, the White House
has responded by supporting its own side more aggressively and by methodically attempting to make
the opposition look bad.35 Which party holds the majority in Congress may very well define the
limits of bargaining in the modern age. By becoming vocal cheerleaders for their side at the expense
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of bipartisan cooperation, presidents risk chipping away at the professional reputation that Neustadt
viewed as imperative for success. Bargaining still takes place, but members of Congress have less of
an incentive to cross party lines when they doubt a president of the opposition party will operate in
good faith.36
Even where powers spill over into power, there is evidence to suggest that bargaining is
predominant. This may not immediately seem self-evident; in the realm of unilateral executive
action, presidents are believed to use unilateral power to avoid bargaining so that they do not need
to wait for Congress to approve their recommendations.37 As Neustadt suggested, however, the
president's powers are far from absolute. The capacity of the chief executive to affect the course and
contours of public policy unilaterally is conditioned on the willingness of Congress and the courts to
check unilateral measures.38 Were a president to issue an executive order that requires funding for
instance, the president would need sufficient support in Congress and the courts to ensure that his
actions are backed by the power of the purse, and favorable interpretations by the judiciary. How
else can this continued support be secured but through persuasion and bargaining?
Only one scholar outright rejects bargaining as the means of power. Samuel Kernell wrote
his treatise Going Public in an effort to reconcile the unorthodox practices of the Reagan
administration with the conventional Neustadtian paradigm. As president, Ronald Reagan was
tremendously successful in forcing the hand of Congress through public appeals. “Going public”
refers to the strategy whereby presidents promote their policies by reaching beyond the Beltway to
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enlist constituent pressure directly.39 Neustadt argues that a president’s efforts to cultivate public
support is a factor operating mostly in the background as a conditioner, not a determinant of what
members of Congress will do about the White House’s requests.40 Conversely, Kernell suggests that
this approach has actually usurped traditional forms of bargaining as Washington has come to look
less like an environment of institutionalized pluralism—one conducive to bargaining—and more like
individualized pluralism—one conducive to going public.41
Kernell’s assertions are well taken; modern communications technology has assuredly
brought the details of interbranch politics into the lives of Americans, and expanded the president's
capacity to reach voters directly. Nevertheless, Kernell’s work overstates the impact that going
public might have, and mistakes the methods employed by Ronald Reagan as a paradigm shift in the
nature of presidential power. The Reagan presidency is an anomaly in that he was the first and only
president to be trained as an actor; the skills he acquired in this profession allowed him to expertly
exploit the changing mass media environment.42 Subsequent media fragmentation and party
polarization have fundamentally changed the environment a contemporary president works in.
Indeed, George Edwards finds that most public appeals fall on deaf ears, as the public is
overwhelmingly inattentive and prone to seeking out information that conforms to their
preconceived notions when it comes to political issues.43

Is the Presidency Weak or Strong?
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Neustadt’s body of work runs counter to many popular conceptions of the presidency,
because it places the president closer to the periphery, rather than the center of the lawmaking
process. In his view, the pursuit of a policy agenda is marked more by compromise than conviction,
and the chief executive’s eventual success or failure ultimately rests with other governmental actors
and their willingness to extend a helping hand. In a general sense, and certainly with respect to the
president's ability to direct public policy, “weak remains the word with which to start” any
discussion of presidential authority.44
A multitude of scholars agree with Neustadt’s perspective. The president is certainly
afforded a special role in American politics and is the focus of the public’s hopes, yet his power to
make and implement policy is limited by the decentralized nature of government.45 The outcome of
this incongruity is incessant scrutiny. All presidents must operate under the prodigious shadows of
their predecessors, and their action or inaction will invariably be measured against the initiative
shown by the likes of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt. Presidential leadership is viewed as
a necessity. But as presidents over the past century have drawn more power to themselves, the level
of critical observation has risen in tandem.46 Accordingly, presidents are granted too much credit
when things go well, and are assigned far too much blame when things go poorly.47
Even so, there exist myriad advantages to the president's position in government that are
impossible to ignore. The chief executive’s iron grip on the flow of information is but one example.
The president can choose to withhold information from the public and Congress with near
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impunity, often under the rubric of “national security.”48 The resultant informational asymmetry
makes it difficult for members of Congress to challenge official statements about events overseas,
heightening presidential power in the foreign policy arena.49 What is more, individual members of
Congress will find it difficult to compete with the president in shaping public opinion. As a single
entity the president demands attention from the press, and often drowns out opposition voices.50
The presidency is certainly a position of strength when it comes to attracting media attention and
directing national discourse.
Though Congress retains the formal power to make laws, and subjects the executive branch
to frequent oversight and complex procedure, the abundance of collective action problems often
makes it difficult for Congress to defend its institutional prerogatives.51 To constrain executive
overreach requires the establishment and maintenance of large coalitions throughout a legislative
process that is riddled with transaction costs.52 Indeed, Congressional dysfunction can be seen as
emboldening recent presidents to take unilateral action to implement their policy goals, rather than
pursuing them through legislation.53

Is Power Personal or Circumstantial
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Another principal split in literature on the presidency is whether power is more personal or
circumstantial in nature. Neustadt firmly believed that who the president is—his background and his
sense of power—would serve to impel or hinder efforts at self help. For Neustadt, a president’s
character represents the key determinant in their effectiveness at influencing the direction of public
policy, so he stressed that the presidency “is no place for amateurs.”54 There are certainly observable
differences in the operating styles of different presidents, thought to directly contribute to
presidential popularity in Congress and indirectly to the man's ability to achieve his legislative
objectives.55 This makes perfect sense if we accept power to be contingent on a president’s
professional reputation and public prestige.
More recent literature counters that contextual factors are what determine the fate of a
president’s agenda on Capitol Hill. From the prevailing political climate in which the president
operates, to the state of the budget and the preferences of certain pivotal voters, current research
suggests that a president’s fortunes in dealing with Congress are heavily skewed by context.56
Presidents with similar leadership qualities can see their power enhanced or diminished depending
on the environment in which they operate; for instance, Congress and the general public will be
more unified with a president when facing a foreign threat.57 Furthermore, the propensity of modern
presidents to exert power by setting public policy on their own and preventing Congress and the
courts from doing much about it speaks to an aggrandizement of influence regardless of personal
qualities.58
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Beyond the resources available to the president, be it experience, geniality, or some other
source of power as Neustadt defines it, factors such as the state of the economy and the partisan
makeup of Congress have indelible impacts on what a president can achieve.59 To be sure, recent
conditions of divided party government and relatively narrow partisan majorities in Congress have
provided a context within which infighting has strong negative effects on the quality and the number
of new initiatives that can be enacted.60 Bipartisan compromise is the exception rather than the
norm. Though it is not the sole determinant, we can expect unified versus divided control to be an
important factor in a president’s ability to exercise power.61 Still, Neustadt and other proponents of
the personal presidency make a compelling case that exceptionally skilled men in office can
overcome the disadvantages of the conditions they face.62

Barack Obama and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act

The Political Context and the Issues at Hand:

The headlines all but wrote themselves when Barack Obama was elected president on
November 4, 2008. It was a victory beyond superlative, viewed globally as a seismic shift in the
greater American political and cultural landscape. For National Public Radio, the headline “Obama
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Pushes Past Race Barriers, Wins White House” was emblazoned in bold on its website.63 The
President-elect’s victory was widely seen as validating the struggle of generations of civil rights
activists who came before, and emphatic declarations such as “Obama Victory Caps Struggles of
Previous Generations” greeted Americans the morning of November 5, 2008.64 At least for that
moment in time, print media was once again in vogue, as millions hoped to secure a souvenir from
this seminal moment.65
To be sure, a sense of history in the making hung over the 2008 election. The son of a white
mother from the Midwest and a black father from Kenya had just become the first African
American to win the presidency in a nation with enduring legacies of racism and prejudice.66 Beyond
the historic implications, the election of Barack Obama was heralded for other reasons as well. His
bold vision of a body politic above partisan division, and his enticing refrains of “hope and change”
drew the support of 53 percent of the electorate, a higher share of the popular vote than any other
Democratic nominee in history except Andrew Jackson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Lyndon Johnson.67
Beyond their eight point victory over the Republican challenger John McCain, the Democrats picked
up 21 seats in the House of Representatives in 2008, bolstering their majority in the chamber to 257
seats.68 The party also gained eight seats in the Senate, later securing a 60 seat supermajority after
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Senator Arlen Specter switched partisan allegiances and Al Franken won a protracted campaign in
Minnesota.69
Opportunity was at hand. Save for the presidencies of Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon
Johnson, circumstances favoring the expansion and implementation of the progressive agenda had
long evaded Democrats.70 The impending period of unified Democratic government—the first
instance since Bill Clinton’s first term—represented a tremendous opportunity to realize pent-up
demand for policy change. Liberal voters and activists expected the President-elect to be swift and
uncompromising in delivering on the initiatives he had championed on the campaign trail.71
Members of the establishment had more subdued reactions however, as many recognized Obama
and the party had benefited tremendously from an unpopular predecessor. George W. Bush left
office with a meager 22 percent approval rating—roughly the level Nixon endured when he resigned
during the Watergate era—and this at a period in his presidency when public sympathy for outgoing
incumbents often kicks in.72 Large majorities vilified Bush the younger for his handling of the
economy, foreign policy, and the escalation of the war in Iraq.73
Although the Democrats recognized the political climate greatly contributed to their success,
they were also well aware that Obama’s message of “hope and change” genuinely inspired people.
The incoming President appeared to demonstrate through his resounding victory that the possibility
of positive and sweeping reform was imminent. Even in the midst of a global financial crisis and
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fraying relations overseas, Obama sought to remold the social contract within the bounds of what
was politically possible.74 His efforts would be aided in no small part by the high degree of issue
homogeneity between himself and Democrats in Congress.75 With considerable agreement on a
policy agenda broadly defined, the majority party could set about confronting the era’s most
intractable problems, from addressing the financial crisis to revolutionizing the nation’s healthcare
system.
Our first case study will examine the Obama administration’s efforts to bring about
comprehensive healthcare reform by working with the 111th Congress. The process by which the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act became law has been widely described as a marathon.
Details of the former President’s involvement in guiding the bill through the legislative branch paint
a somewhat different picture of presidential power than what Neustadt originally described, yet this
episode is very instructive in delineating the limits of power. Though President Obama was
ultimately successful, his struggles also lend credence to Neustadt’s interpretation of the office as
fundamentally weak when it comes to legislating.
Improving healthcare in the United States has long been a policy priority for Democratic
administrations, with debate over the best means of reform dating back to the presidency of
Franklin Roosevelt.76 The Obama administration would be remiss to pass up this opportunity at
finally realizing the priorities of the Democratic party. After expending political capital in the form
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, the President moved aggressively to turn the
attention of Congress to transforming the American healthcare system. Obama knew he must tread
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carefully: the sepector of the Clinton administration’s bungled healthcare reform efforts 15 years
previously still loomed large. Like the new President, Clinton came into office with bold visions of
expanding access to insurance.77 The eventual failure of the Clinton plan was due to many oversights
the Obama administration would take note of, but it was such a traumatizing affair that healthcare
reform was subsequently viewed as a policy issue to be avoided.78 Still, President Obama argued that
efforts to expand access to healthcare and lower costs, though ambitious and politically volatile,
were necessary to address before there could be real economic recovery.79

Charting a Course Through a Polarized Congress:

The United States was quickly spiraling into economic collapse on the eve of President
Obama’s first term. With an economy shedding jobs at a rate not seen since the Great Depression,
and investment indices rapidly plummeting, the President assumed office at a moment of heightened
pressure and uncertainty.80 This inheritance from the previous administration—sardonically referred
to by Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel as the George W. Bush “gift bag”—placed the Obama
presidency in a particularly delicate position, both in terms of the potential for substantive progress
and the acute consequences of failure.81 New presidents traditionally claim a mandate to implement
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their agendas, and the Obama campaign message of wholesale change had clearly struck a chord
with the American public. It was in the best interests of the new administration to take advantage of
these circumstances by rapidly pursuing healthcare reform when the President’s mandate, and
resultant legislative clout, was at its peak. Conversely, the public’s high expectations and the
harrowing state of the economy would make the repercussions of defeat all the more intense.82
The reforms proposed by the Obama campaign would shape the political agenda during the
President’s first two years in office. It was ultimately Democratic partisanship that would carry the
day however.83 Obama and most Congressional Democrats ran on similar platforms, as to be
expected when political parties are somewhat ideologically homogeneous.84 Thus, the greater
political context encouraged cooperation between the President and the majority party in Congress.
Drawing lessons from the failures of the Clinton administration, Obama did not submit a
comprehensive healthcare plan to Congress, instead laying out general principles and trusting
leadership to fill in the details.85 Those close to the President, many of whom were veterans of
Capitol Hill, counseled that members who participate directly in crafting legislation have a greater
stake in and thus will push harder for its success.86 Delegating authority to members would empower
them to craft a bill that would ostensibly pass, and the President could then step in toward the end
of the legislative process to shape the final product, while maintaining flexibility in what was sure to
be a messy affair.
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If strong partisanship was to lay the groundwork for success, so too would it set the terms of
debate and define the limits of what could be achieved. Rapid party polarization, with roots in the
preceding decades, had burgeoned as a consequence of a shrinking Republican conference. Losses in
the 2006 and 2008 elections meant that the GOP’s ideological center of gravity both coalesced and
moved even further right.87 This gulf between Democrats and Republicans at the outset of the 111th
Congress was only exacerbated by differing expectations of what an Obama presidency would mean
for the United States. Republican and Republican leaning independents were vehement in their
opposition to the new Chief Executive, many viewing President Obama as an untrustworthy, radical
leftist with a socialist agenda.88 Their consternation heralded the arrival of a new conservative bloc,
concerned with all manner of issues from government overreach to federal deficits, with one key
issue on which they were all in agreement: President Obama and the Democratic Congress had to be
stopped.89 Despite repeated calls for bipartisan cooperation on the campaign trail, Obama and
Democratic Congressional leadership knew they could expect little help on healthcare reform from
Republicans in Congress.
President Obama and his counterparts on Capitol Hill duly moved ahead with the
knowledge their initiatives would pass so long as the Democratic caucus remained united. From the
earliest stages of the healthcare debate, the White House trod carefully, negotiating with those in the
healthcare industry to craft a plan acceptable to corporate interests.90 This was to the new President’s
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credit. Obama may have looked down on the ponderous, give-and-take nature of the legislative
process, but his prior experiences in the Senate gave him insight into how the institutions of
government function and the ways his team could design a proposal that would withstand scrutiny.91
In Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt posits that influence in government adheres to those
with a keen sense of its composition and shape.92 Given that choices are the means by which a
president guards power as influence, Neustadt professes that the president unacquainted with
government is less likely to make decisions conducive to retaining prospective power.93 Had
President Obama railed against the pharmaceutical and insurance industries, as a more impulsive
president might have done, the resultant mobilized opposition might well have doomed the
administration’s healthcare plans from the beginning.94 As it was, Obama’s Office of Health Care
Reform and Congressional leadership worked to construct policies that preempted attack and
created incentives to win over the support of powerful stakeholders.95
Meanwhile on Capitol Hill, Speaker Nancy Pelosi took charge of shepherding healthcare
reform through the House of Representatives. The process was relatively smooth during the early
stages of debate. In order to increase the chances of a bill passing and to avoid turf battles, Pelosi
tasked the chairmen of the three committees with jurisdiction to negotiate a single bill.96 H.R. 3962
would be introduced in all three committees. Together with her leadership team and a number of
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liaisons from the West Wing, Speaker Pelosi undertook a months long campaign to consult, educate,
and negotiate with members of the House.97
The bill hit an early roadblock in the Energy and Commerce Committee, when a
conservative Democratic contingent—the so-called “Bluedog Democrats”—decried the inclusion of
a public option, and what they believed would be insufficient cost controls.98 This flashpoint laid
bare an unfortunate reality for Democratic leadership: while their party was by and large
ideologically homogeneous, it was far from monolithic. The House majority in the 111th Congress
included 49 members from districts that John McCain won in the 2008 election.99 Indeed, the
Democrats' gains in Congress may have overstated the country's push toward liberal ideals, as many
Congressional Democrats still identified as conservative.100
With no Republican support for the bill, the requests of those in the Democratic Party who
were willing to voice their opposition were taken very seriously.101 The challenge for the White
House and Congressional leadership was to produce legislation that corralled these necessary
holdouts, while also delivering on the promises made to the liberal mainstream of their membership.
In a pattern that would repeat itself throughout the healthcare debate, party leadership stepped in to
devise a compromise, and on July 29, 2009, a deal was finally reached.102 Contrary to the Neustadtian
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ideal of a Chief Executive dynamically leaning on his persuasive power to lobby members of
Congress, President Obama retained his distance from the Hill during this time, though his aides
were heavily involved. The position of deference to party leaders may well have enhanced the bill’s
chances of success, but it limited the ability of the President to referee the ensuing conflict, while
also opening up the process to greater scrutiny from the press.103
H.R. 3962 passed the House on November 7, 2009. The final vote was 220 to 215, with 39
Democrats voting against the bill, 31 of whom represented districts carried by John McCain in 2008.
104

One Republican voted for the bill—Representative Joseph Cao of Louisiana—but only after

passage was assured. In the end, Speaker Pelosi was forced to pull the robust public option, while
also allowing a stringent antiabortion amendment to be offered on the floor—both decisions liberals
opposed, but both essential to securing the bill’s passage.105

A Marathon in the Senate:

Healthcare reform faced an uncertain future in the Senate, where Democratic leadership
oversaw a chamber largely devoid of the same institutional prerogatives and procedures designed to
facilitate majority rule in the House. Majority Leader Harry Reid’s caucus, though 60 members
strong, could not afford any defections, as Senate rules at the time allowed for any senator to
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“filibuster” a bill they opposed.106 Only by reaching the requisite 60 vote threshold could the
Democrats invoke cloture and end debate. Moreover, both Majority Leader Reid and President
Obama hoped to gain some Republican support for any potential legislation, so as to bolster its
legitimacy.107 Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus had for months attempted to forge
a bipartisan deal, and finally reported a bill out of committee in September of 2009 after numerous
delays.
During this time, fine electoral margins would once again enhance the bargaining power of a
small but critical group of moderate holdouts. President Obama and Democratic leadership would
thus be required to compromise on a number of provisions unpalatable to the more liberal members
of Congress.108 Senator Joe Lieberman demanded any form of the public option be dropped from
the bill, while provisions that would result in more medicaid funds for Louisiana and Nebraska were
included to sway Senators Mary Landrieu and Ben Nelson, respectively.109 The Senate bill also relied
on state-based insurance exchanges, rather than a single national exchange, where the self-employed,
small businesses, and others without insurance could go to purchase plans.110 It was assumed any
discrepancies with the House version could be reconciled once the Senate passed their bill and
moved to the conference committee stage.
The process of forging a single bill from the two chambers was almost derailed in January of
2010. Republican Scott Brown, running on an anti-healthcare reform and anti-Washington platform,
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won the Senate seat left vacant by the death of Ted Kennedy in liberal Massachusetts.111 The loss
deprived the Democrats of their filibuster-proof supermajority in the Senate, and the uncertain
future of healthcare reform came close to provoking panic among Democratic members in both
chambers.112 Many began to chastise President Obama; the Democrats had lost control of the debate
and the media was whipped into a veritable frenzy, with cross-aisle pundits declaring healthcare
reform on life support.113 There was a consensus amongst D.C. insiders that the President had failed
to convey a clear and coherent message that would help healthcare reform pass, instead attempting
to thread the needle between bipartisanship and the principled idealism demanded by the
progressive core of the Democratic party.
President Obama moved swiftly to contain the fallout. First, the Obama White House
attempted to use a public forum to reiterate their case for healthcare reform, organizing a policy
summit in late February 2010.114 Faith in the power of the presidential pulpit was strong amongst
those close to the President, but perhaps misguided when viewed in light of Richard Neustadt’s
teachings. President Obama, though polished and professorial, was ill-equipped to explain the
complexities of the healthcare system and the proposed reforms to a largely inattentive audience.
Healthcare policy is such a complex issue in the United States that even the most articulate orator
would struggle to be persuasive. Furthermore, a president’s standing outside the beltway is little
more than a jumble of imprecise impressions, held by a fickle public with apathetic tendencies.115
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Presidential teaching as a means of expediting the legislative process is thought to be of limited
effectiveness, in part because it solidifies policy positions, heightens rhetoric, and personalizes issues.
116

The Obama PR offensive was useful however in that it placed focus back on the substance of the

issues at hand, rather than on Congressional maneuvering, while also providing time and cover for
Democratic leadership to strategize.117
Many Democratic members of Congress initially disheartened by the Massachusetts special
election were encouraged by the administration’s stronger public posture.118 An unorthodox path
forward, already bruited about, was to be employed in order to secure passage of healthcare reform.
The House planned to pass the Senate version of the healthcare bill, which would go directly to the
President's desk and become law. Speaker Pelosi would then pass an additional bill with addendums
to the Senate proposal, to ensure the most important adjustments demanded by the House were
adopted. These revisions would only deal with financing and not policy change, and could thus be
taken up under the budget reconciliation process and pass the Senate with a simple majority vote.
On March 21 2009, the House passed the Senate bill on a 219 to 212 vote, with 34 Democrats
joining all Republican members in opposition. Obama signed the bill into the law on March 23, and
the Senate then passed the reconciliation bill on March 25, by a vote of 56 to 43. The Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act was now the law of the land.

Outcome and Aftermath:
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After the passage of the initial House bill, President Obama boldly proclaimed that “at a
time when the pundits said it was no longer possible, we rose above the weight of our politics… we
proved we are still a people capable of doing big things and tackling our biggest challenges.”119 The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, colloquially known henceforth as “Obamacare” was
certainly big, both in the terms of the bill’s scope and it’s political significance. The legislation
constitutes the most comprehensive change to health policy since the passage of Medicare in 1965.
120

Among other provisions, the Affordable Care Act prohibits private insurers from denying

coverage due to preexisting conditions, subsidizes insurance premiums, supports medical research,
and expands eligibility for federal healthcare for low-income individuals through the Medicaid
program. It also instituted a widely unpopular “individual mandate,” an additional tax on individuals
able to afford health insurance but unwilling to buy it.
Barack Obama assumed office intent on transforming American politics. Instead of
transforming politics however, politics transformed Obama, with political circumstances forcing the
President to adopt a more overtly partisan approach to healthcare reform.121 The debate highlighted
a fundamental difference between liberals and their sense that the government has a responsibility to
protect and provide for its citizens, and conservatives who believed the government should have a
limited role in regulating the healthcare industry.122 There was to be no bipartisan compromise, and
the Affordable Care Act was a presidential failure in this sense. Obama was unable to secure any
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GOP votes for the initiative, unlike Franklin Roosevelt for Social Security and Lyndon Johnson for
Medicare.123
The content of the more than 2,700 page bill, as well as the laborious process by which it
became law, is illustrative of a shift in our political processes from the Neustadtian vision of a
bargaining president. Neustadt characterized the mid-century period in which he wrote as a moment
of weakened party ties, where debate was rarely stymied by partisan bickering. In describing the
contemporary struggle for power between Congress and the chief executive however, polarization is
the word with which to start. Congressional Republicans were diametrically opposed to the majority
party’s initiatives from the beginning. Opposition turned to abject hatred, as an anti-big-government
movement dubbing itself the Tea Party gained traction after the fallout from the healthcare debate.
124

Coupled with increased number of ideologically-driven cable news shows and a slow economic

recovery, the political right uniformly refused to associate with the new President.
Debate over the Affordable Care Act signaled a transition to a modern political reality of
heightened partisan bickering and an unwillingness to compromise.125 This so-called affective
partisanship sets the terms of bargaining in the modern era. As the modern president can only rely
on support from his own party, persuasion becomes less about corralling 535 individual members
and more about enticing those few holdouts to tow the party line. President Obama ostensibly won
the battle for healthcare reform, not because of his own political dynamism, but because of partisan
cleavages and the resulting Democratic unity. Speaker Pelosi and Majority Leader Reid willingly
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made passing the President’s agenda their first priority, because they saw his success as essential to
their own.126 Coupled with an increasingly ideologically homogeneous membership, the majority
party had amassed formidable power to enact policy change without input from the minority party.
Indeed, the necessity to cultivate a favorable professional reputation in the modern day seems
limited only to members of the president’s own party.
The character Obama brought to the office certainly had a part to play as well, for better or
for worse. The President’s operating style, as well as his political predictions and his policy
preferences were subject to frequent criticism from both sides of the aisle.127 His detached
involvement in the process, though expedient in terms of allowing Pelosi and Reid to take the lead,
runs contrary to the Neustadtian vision of a president intimately involved in the details that will help
or hurt his power stakes. Obama did not enjoy routinely meeting or socializing with lawmakers, and
this professional reputation in effect precluded the President’s ability to woo those he needed to
persuade.128
The Affordable Care Act was to be implemented over the coming years in a decidedly
incremental fashion. Obama initially counseled patience, but patience is not counted as one of the
strong points of American politics.129 By the eve of the 2010 midterm elections, Democratic
prospects were dim. A slow economic recovery and a landmark healthcare initiative with delayed
benefits earned the Democrats a veritable “shellacking.” The party wound up losing 63 seats in the
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House of Representatives, as well as a net loss of six seats in the Senate; one must go back to 1938
for an election when a party suffered losses of this magnitude.”130 For all the early achievements of
the Obama administration, the midterm results revealed the 111th Congress to be “both historically
busy and epically unpopular.”131 Court challenges to the Affordable Care Act also limited its impact,
and continued throughout Obama’s second term and into the Trump presidency.

Donald Trump and the American Health Care Act

The Political Context and the Issues at Hand:

In his February 2017 address to Congress after an unanticipated triumph in the 2016
election, President Donald Trump called on the legislative branch “to repeal and replace Obamacare
with reforms that expand choice, increase access, lower costs, and at the same time, provide better
healthcare.”132 His remarks were greeted with thunderous applause, though only from the
President’s own party. Republicans were understandably buoyant; after seven years of merciless
hostility toward President Obama’s marquee legislative achievement, the GOP assumed unified
control of Washington in 2017 for just the second time in sixty years.133 As president, Barack Obama
had time and again rebuffed attempts to abrogate his administration’s work on healthcare reform.134
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Channeling their frustration, conservatives mobilized a loose coalition with ambitions to slash
government spending and roll back the American welfare state.135 Their relentless efforts in
fundraising and organizing had pushed GOP candidates to victory. With a Republican now in the
White House, party leaders were keen to forge a new governing contract. A Trump presidency was
finally a chance to deliver.
Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 election meant that the most important policy changes
of the Barack Obama presidency were under serious threat. Not only was Trump empowered to
follow through on his campaign promises, the Republican sweep could reasonably be seen as a
mandate to reverse course from the previous eight years.136 Trump successfully campaigned on vows
to undo the actions of the previous administration, and reveled in his role as the antithesis of his
prudent, restrained, and cerebral predecessor.137 Certainly, Trump the candidate made repeated and
impassioned pledges to dismantle the Affordable Care Act.138 Also on the chopping block was a
series of divisive executive actions taken by the Obama administration, as well as a slew of tax and
regulatory policies designed to emphasize redistribution over efficiency and uninhibited growth.139
Even so, the repeal and replacement of Obamacare was slated to be the signature accomplishment
of the Trump administration's first year, with the Republican party keen to take advantage of a
policy window left tantalizingly ajar.140
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Our second case study will examine the Trump administration’s efforts to repeal and replace
the Affordable Care Act through legislation. These actions provide agreeable symmetry with our
look at the Obama administration’s earlier success in passing the initial law, in terms of the partisan
makeups of government, the timing, and the policy area in question. Moreover, the failures of the
Trump administration detailed in this case study can be understood best through a Neustadtian lens.
The task before Donald Trump seemed deceptively straightforward to the outside observer.
Democrats constructed a law replete with procedural complexities and obscured benefits, as well as
an easily targeted “individual mandate” that penalized those who did not purchase insurance.141
Given the widespread rejection of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions by red states across the
country, many low income, Medicaid-eligible individuals were forced to turn to the private ACA
insurance markets, increasing premiums across the board and providing Republicans with plentiful
142

ammunition.

But Republican’s faced united opposition from Democrats and a consortium of
143

liberal interest groups.

What is more, Republican divisions had been on display as recently as a few

weeks before the election, when many GOP leaders deserted Trump in the wake of the Access
Hollywood tapes.

144

President Trump took office as a divisive figure, and a slim majority in the

Senate, as well as a Republican Conference rife with internal divisions, would ultimately spell doom
for his administration’s efforts to repeal Obamacare. The President’s failure to cultivate sufficient
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professional reputation and public prestige may well have precluded the use of his presidential
power in this instance.

Uncertainty in the House:

Republicans in the House of Representatives, led by Speaker Paul Ryan, assumed control of
translating the President’s promises on healthcare reform into concrete legislative achievement. The
plan they finally presented to the Senate was an amalgamation of disparate proposals advanced by
the GOP during the preceding administration, a package of reforms that would become the
American Health Care Act.145 The bill eliminated many of the more controversial and visible
provisions of Obamacare. It was also a manifesto of conservative views on the welfare state decades
in the making. Buried in the myriad sections of the AHCA was the elimination of the ACA’s
unpopular individual mandate, a move widely expected to subvert and ultimately implode the ACA
insurance exchanges.146 Perhaps more significantly, the plan not only halted Obamacare’s Medicaid
expansion, but phased out Medicaid's entitlement status for individuals, converting it into a per
capita allotment or a fixed-dollar block grant to individual states.147 The AHCA would also authorize
states to opt out of insurance regulations, such as those that constrain policies with pre-existing
conditions, and slash federal funding for Planned Parenthood.148 All told, the Congressional Budget
Office estimated that while the law would drastically cut federal spending, it would also result in 24
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million fewer individuals with insurance coverage within a decade.149 The President and
Congressional Republicans were poised for a fight, as much of the AHCA was bound to be an
exceedingly tough sell.
The initial signs were cause for optimism from Speaker Ryan and the new president. In early
spring, two prominent committees in the House of Representatives—Energy and Commerce and
Ways and Means—approved a draft version of the AHCA on party line votes.150 Problems first
arose when the bill went to the Budget committee and three members of the House Freedom
Caucus voted against leadership, scuttling the bill on a narrow 19 to 17 margin.151 However drastic
the proposed changes to existing healthcare policy, they did not satisfy conservative organizations
like Americans for Prosperity and the Heritage Foundation, who argued that the AHCA was
“Obamacare Lite.”152 At the other end of the Republican Conference, moderates opposed the
AHCA’s cuts to Medicaid expansion, particularly after the CBO’s prognosis on the number of
potential new uninsured individuals should the bill become law.153
President Trump adopted a largely hands-off approach as Speaker Ryan and other House
leaders struggled to fashion a bill that would be acceptable to both moderates and conservatives
during this phase in the healthcare debate. That his stance was markedly similar to the one adopted
by President Obama during the passage of the Affordable Care Act should come as little surprise. In
an age where party polarization defines the limits of interbranch relations, leaders from a president’s
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own party will be inclined to cooperate with the White House so long as the electoral and policy
goals of members align with those of the president.154 Most Republicans were vehement in their
desire for an alternative to Obamacare, just as Democrats in 2009 were keen to reform the status
quo. Trump was wise to cede control to House leadership, just as Obama had done during the
crafting of his healthcare bill years earlier.
Trump initially acted mostly as “cheerleader-in-chief,” rather than a hands-on negotiator: he
publicly praised the AHCA as a “great bill,” fielded the concerns of individual legislators, and urged
them to come together in private meetings. In true Neustadtian fashion, Trump utilized the full
panoply of advantages inherent in the presidency, including hosting private lunches and dinner at
the White House, sharing rides on Air Force One, and even scheduling a bowling event for
lawmakers.155 Neustadt was clear enough that a president looking to persuade may be far more
effective than his logic or charm could make him by leaning on the status and authority of his office.
156

That said, President Trump found it exceedingly difficult to garner sufficient professional

reputation when he had already cultivated the impression that he was not a negotiator operating in
good faith. The best form of self-help, Neustadt argued, is to think of power prospectively and
jealously guard one’s prospective power through matters of choice.157 Though D.C. insiders cannot
afford to ground their expectations of how the president will act with erroneous slippages, these
accumulate, and a president’s influence can wane with repeated displays of incapacity.158
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President Trump vacillated wildly on what exactly he expected of Republicans in Congress,
at times endorsing the House bill and hedging his support when a solution seemed out of reach.159
Frustrated by the defections from both the conservative and moderate wings of his party, the White
House pushed for a vote of the full House, hoping the prospect of legislative defeat would force the
hands of the Republicans who were still withholding support.160 On the day of the vote, Speaker
Ryan pulled the legislation when it became clear it would not pass. Trump initially responded by
blaming Democrats, but in what would prove to be a pattern throughout the healthcare debate, he
later shifted blame to Republicans by tweeting that his followers should watch a Jeanine Pirro
segment on Fox News in which she demanded Paul Ryan’s resignation as Speaker.161
This underhanded treatment of the man charged with delivering healthcare reform
legislation in the House was no anomaly. President Trump regularly admonished members of his
own cabinet, including then Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, an early and staunch supporter of
the Trump agenda.162 Republicans in Congress would likely have observed these episodes wondering
why they should risk covering the President’s back when he could not be counted on to take care of
his own. With his general reputation shaped by an observable pattern of indecisiveness and reneging,
Trump had established himself as a backstabber.
Roughly a month after the failed vote in the House of Representatives, negotiations among
Congressional leadership, members of the Freedom Caucus, and the Tuesday Group finally brought

Gary Jacobson, “Donald Trump, the Public, and Congress: The First 7 Months,” Forum 15, no. 3 (October 2017),
534.
160
Matthew Dickinson & Kate Reinmuth, “Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is National,” Forum 15, no. 3
(October 2017), 445.
161
Matthew Dickinson & Kate Reinmuth, “Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is National,” Forum 15, no. 3
(October 2017), 445.
162
Gary Jacobson, “Donald Trump, the Public, and Congress: The First 7 Months,” Forum 15, no. 3 (October 2017),
540.
159

42
about the passage of the AHCA in the House.163 In its final form, the legislation squeaked through
by a margin of two votes, with every Democrat and 20 Republicans dissenting.164 Trump was
nonetheless pleased, and summoned members of the majority party to the White House for a photo
opportunity. He praised the work of Speaker Ryan, and exalted the AHCA as “a great plan,” adding,
“I actually think it will get even better [as this process] has brought the Republican party together.”
165

His optimism was short lived. The House process revealed a Republican Conference divided on

how to go about repealing and replacing the Affordable Care Act, and despite a 47-vote majority in
that chamber, House GOP leadership had struggled to pass the bill. Given members’ wariness of
Trump’s character and involvement, the AHCA faced an uncertain future in the Senate,. with its
two-vote Republican majority.

Troubles in the Senate:

Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell was initially hesitant to introduce draft legislation,
for fear of members of his own party publicly criticizing the plan.166 The House Freedom Caucus
had extracted key concessions, such as the provision that allowed states to opt out of consumer
protections under the ACA.167 Senator McConnell was wary of modifying the House bill in a way
that would attract the support of moderates, as there was no guarantee an amended bill would pass
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the House a second time.168 Conservatives, including Rand Paul, Mike Lee, Ron Johnson, and Ted
Cruz, sought amendments to further weaken provisions of the Affordable Care Act, while
moderates such as Susan Collins opposed efforts to defund Planned Parenthood.169 A president
hoping to successfully navigate this perilous track through America’s upper chamber would have
been wise to heed Neustadt’s lessons on reputation as a source of presidential power. Instead,
President Trump doubled down on his choice to diminish his reputation through indecision and
unreliability he adopted during debate in the House of Representatives.
170

Donald Trump appeared largely to recuse himself from substantive debate in the Senate.
Matters of detail were left to party leaders to hash out in relative privacy, while the President

alternatively promoted Republican efforts and warned about the consequences of failure at regular
intervals. These actions often proved to be counterproductive. Even after praising Republican
members of the House for their vote on the AHCA, Trump later described their legislation as
“mean” when it became clear many of the more contentious provisions would not play well in the
171

Senate.

He declined to provide much guidance to Republicans during this time on what he would
172

sign, with the overriding objective seeming to be legislative victory at all costs.

This ambiguity did
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little to inspire loyalty and compliance on the part of Republican holdouts, as they could not be sure
173

the President would support them should things go awry.

The members of Congress who a president persuades must be convinced that the chief
executive has the skill and will to call on his available wells of power; their judgement in this respect
determines the president’s capacity for influence.174 That Trump waited for the Senate to act, rather
than working with individual Republican Senators to develop a solution during this time, left the
175

Senate with no clear direction.

Being president is not like being CEO: the pluralistic nature of

American government means that Congress does not work for the president and cannot be ordered
176

to act on his behalf.

As Neustadt observed, a president has considerable access to power that is

bolstered by reputation, but President Trump’s enduring reputation as an unreliable negotiator and a
man prone to petty insults and reneging severely constrained his ability to influence Republican
holdouts. On the campaign trail, Trump had volleyed insults at Senator John McCain, ridiculing the
177

Senator’s military service and insinuating that McCain could not be considered a proper war hero.

Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska also bore the President’s ire, receiving a call from the President’s
interior secretary, Ryan Zinke, warning of repercussions for the Senator’s home state after her initial
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vote against proceeding with the healthcare debate.

178

The experiences of many previous presidents

demonstrated that senators are unlikely to respond well to strong arm tactics.

179

It should come as

no surprise that the president’s choices lost him the votes of these senators, votes that led to the
defeat of the bill.
Though Neustadt de-emphasizes the role that public prestige plays in persuasion, it is
important to note many of the key public opinion trends that colored debate over the AHCA.
President Trump entered office as one of the more polarizing presidents in recent memory;
Democrats and many left-leaning voters were universally appalled by the President’s character and
policy objectives during the 2016 campaign, with his early conduct in office doing little to change
their appraisals.180 This relatively low standing with the public served to blunt the President’s
influence in Congress as Democrats had every reason to oppose him.

In looking at Trump’s failures through a Neustadian lens, it is also compelling to look at the
healthcare debate’s impact on public assessments of the Affordable Care Act. The passage of the
AHCA in the House riled nearly every major organization with a stake in healthcare, from the
American Medical Association to the AARP.181 The Republican bill polled terribly—whether viewed
in isolation or in comparison with the ACA. In a survey taken on the eve of the House vote, just 17
percent of Americans said they supported the reforms proposed by House Republicans.182 Public
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attitudes toward the ACA had markedly improved by the time debate shifted to the Senate; a Kaiser
Family Foundation found the ACA breaking 50 percent favorability for the first time since its
adoption in 2010.183 With the status quo under threat, Republican efforts to dismantle the
Affordable Care Act accomplished what President Obama could not in his time in office: sell the
ACA to the American public.

The Outcome and the Aftermath:

On July 28, 2017, a pensive John McCain approached Majority Leader McConnell in the well
of the Senate. After a number of failed partial repeals, Senate leadership had put forward their own
version of the AHCA for a final vote. Senator McConnell employed the budget reconciliation
184

process to ensure that only a simple majority was needed to pass the legislation.

Senator McCain’s

vote was so crucial to Republican efforts, he had flown in from his home state after being diagnosed
with terminal brain cancer. The bill would fail if McCain were to vote no.
In one of the more dramatic moments in recent Senate history, and with the eyes of a nation
upon him, McCain turned down his thumb, eliciting audible gasps and a smattering of applause
from the chamber. McCain’s vote effectively ended the Republicans’ best chance to repeal the
Affordable Care Act.

185

Two other Republicans—Senators Murkowski and Collins—joined McCain,

as well as all 46 Senate Democrats and two independents in rejecting Republican efforts. For four
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election cycles, the GOP had railed against the Obama administration’s signature legislative
achievement. They controlled both houses of Congress and the White House, yet failed in their
attempt to repeal the ACA. The recriminations would be immediate and severe. The defeat was a
cutting blow to President Donald Trump and Republican leadership in Congress, as the party had
framed repealing and replacing Obamacare as a test of their ability to implement the Republican
186

agenda.

How might Donald Trump have increased his chances of legislative success in this instance?
Not insulting his fellow party members would have been a good start. Richard Neustadt would
suggest that Trump’s failures are due in large part to the poor professional reputation he cultivated
on Capitol Hill. Indeed, members of his own party have argued that the intermittent strong-arm
tactics employed by the administration made it more difficult to secure a winning coalition for repeal
and replace.187 John McCain was certainly disinclined to fall in line behind Trump’s initiatives after
being on the receiving end of the President’s vitriol. Though the President regularly invoked loyalty
during the healthcare debate, it was rarely reciprocated. He repeatedly demonstrated that his
understanding of the term implied unconditional backing and not that he’d do his part in bargaining.
188

Trump reportedly called Majority Leader McConnell to berate him for “bungling” the healthcare

vote, in addition to issuing a steady drumbeat of public condemnations for Republicans in Congress
after the failed vote.189
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Trump would also have been better served focusing his initial attention on legislation that
would have attracted more Democratic support. For instance, a major investment in infrastructure
projects—favored by more than 80 percent of voters—would have been far less divisive than
190

repealing the ACA.

Such an agenda would have forced Democrats to engage with a president their

constituents detested, if they actually sought to accomplish something during their time in the
minority. From the perspective of Neustadt, pursuing infrastructure would have been wise in that it
would have enhanced the President’s prospective power. Impressions of a new President are formed
early and last a long time, meaning a willingness to reach across the aisle and pursue bipartisan
compromise might have improved Trump’s professional reputation and his standing with the public.
A bipartisan approach in true Neustadtian fashion would have faced its own difficulties, however.
Our current climate of intense partisanship means that presidents are encouraged to take positions
191

that bolster their own party, while becoming “critic in chief” of the opposition.

Displaying a

willingness to work with Democrats might well have alienated Trump within his own party.
Subsequent action on healthcare by the current administration has taken two principal
forms. The first and most enduring was the elimination of the individual mandate in Congressional
Republican’s subsequent work on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. This is no trivial development,
as the ACA was largely dependent on the individual mandate to arrest rising premium costs. The
Trump administration also has sought to undermine the law through a series of administrative
actions. These include shortening the ACA enrollment period, reducing the availability of trained
staffers at call-in centers to assist enrollees, discouraging insurance company participation by
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increasing the uncertainty over the future availability of subsidies, and even using Obamacare budget
funds dedicated to expanding healthcare to launch a public relations campaign against the law.192
The healthcare industry is one of the most heavily regulated in the United States, and
existing statute contains many discretionary provisions allowing federal departments and agencies to
undermine or support the Affordable Care Act as they see fit.193 Donald Trump’s uncompromising
search for loyalty is useful in this respect, because his charges in the executive branch will have an
easier time reshuffling the federal bureaucracy than the President did in grappling with Congress. It
could indeed be argued that this unilateral approach may yet end up being more successful in
weakening the ACA than the legislative route.194 That said, unilateral executive actions are temporary
measures that have no sticking power beyond the tenure of the president who issues them. It is
telling that Richard Neustadt suggests the unilateral powers of the presidency are fundamentally
limited, costly, and above all an indication of failure rather than mastery.195

Conclusion

In life, the affable, chain-smoking Richard Neustadt revolutionized study of the presidency
through the use of applied theory.196 His work was an attempt to reconcile the conjectural with the
practical, to bridge the gap between the detached work of his predecessors and his first-hand
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experiences in the White House. Neustadt perceived an institution ill-equipped to respond to
demand for presidential action in the ways it would like; despite the president’s rarified position in
the American political system, weakness was the underlying theme of Presidential Power.197 Especially
when grappling with an adversarial Congress, the president wishing to make his influence felt must
recognize his position as both independent and at the same time intertwined with disparate sources
of power in a pluralistic system. Our constitutional republic is composed of separate institutions
sharing power: to share is to limit, and this is the heart of Neustadt’s conception of presidential
power.198
Nearly every subsequent work of scholarship on the presidency pays homage to Neustadt’s
seminal view of presidential power as influence or persuasion in this separated system.199 Yet there
remains debate over the direction of presidential studies, rooted in criticism of Neustadt’s work.
Detractors bemoan the subfield's dominant methodology: the focus on individual presidents, the
reliance on thick description rather than systematic data analysis, and the general failure to craft
testable hypotheses.200 All are valid criticisms, broadly seen to have precluded the elevation of
presidential studies to the forefront of political science research. Yet the efforts of scholars to
grapple with Neustadt’s teachings have still inspired some of the subfield's most enduring
discoveries.201 Above all else, the presidency is understood to be a position rife with paradox. The
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president is at once expected to provide decisive leadership to solve the nation’s problems, while at
the same time fundamentally constrained by the constitutional system in which he operates.202
The distinct political climate that influenced Neustadt’s understanding of the nature of
presidential power also calls into question his theory’s applicability in the modern age. The
environments faced by Presidents Obama and Trump are certainly different from those of Truman
and Eisenhower. To test the longevity of Neustadt’s arguments, we took a thorough look at our two
most recent presidents and their attempts to persuade Congress to join them in their favored
legislation regarding healthcare reform, one of the most controversial policy issues of recent
decades.
How applicable are Neustadt’s insights to the modern presidential-Congressional dynamic?
Given the deficiencies that arise when applying the lessons of a dated piece of scholarly literature to
a changing political context, is presidential power still the power to persuade?
The experiences of President’s Obama and Trump suggest the answer is yes, with some
caveats. At the most rudimentary level, the framework Neustadt identifies is still in place. These case
studies depicted presidents operating as strategic power optimizers in an environment colored by the
give-and-take nature of every interaction. As Neustadt suggested, the president cannot expect action
without argument.203 Both Presidents Obama and Trump were driven to deliver a lasting legacy by
developing an impactful domestic policy agenda that could only be implemented by working with
Congress. Both Presidents also found themselves without many tools to accomplish their aims
except for maximizing professional reputation and public prestige.
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This is where the nature of presidential power differs somewhat from the traditional
Neustadtian conception. The rapid advancement of party polarization precludes a cooperative
Presidential-Congressional relationship in all but the most extraordinary circumstances. Policy
differences between Democrats and Republicans in Washington have increased over the past several
decades to a degree unfathomable to Richard Neustadt.204 The concerted movement of both parties
to the ideological extremes has fostered Congressional dysfunction, familiar to the modern audience
but not to the mid-century modern period analyzed by Neustadt. Conservative Democrats and
liberal Republicans who once occupied key leadership positions in the House and Senate have
almost disappeared, and there are far fewer moderates in both parties.205 As a result, partisan
compromise is the exception rather than the norm, and divided party control is more likely to result
in gridlock on major domestic issues.206 Comprehensive healthcare reform became the top domestic
priority for Presidents Obama and Trump largely because they enjoyed unified party government;
had the opposition party controlled even one chamber in Congress, healthcare might have taken a
back seat to more easily achievable policy goals.
Political circumstance can be understood to impede or enhance a president’s persuasive
capacity. Having control of a unified government changes the calculation. Because members of the
opposition party cannot be relied on to aid the president, a chief executive looking to succeed under
this condition need only reach out to likeminded Congressional leadership and holdouts in his own
party. Literature on the subject suggests that the more uniform the preferences of the majority party,
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and the more distinct they are from the policy views of the minority, the more they should have an
observable influence on party leadership. When the majority party coheres around a certain policy,
its members are more willing to delegate agenda-setting authority and other powers and resources to
their party leaders.207 Thus, Presidents Obama and Trump were able to reach out to majority party
leadership, as these individuals accurately spoke for their respective caucuses and could guide the
President's policy goals to fruition. There was little need to cultivate relationships with individual
members.
The broader political circumstance—favorable majorities in Congress and strong
partisanship—would ultimately play a critical role in the cases of Obama and Trump.
Many of the finer points of Neustadt’s Presidential Power were borne out as well. President Obama
was certainly aided in his efforts to pass the Affordable Care Act by his prior experiences in
government, however brief they may have been. Neustadt posits that a president’s professional
reputation and public prestige turn on what his constituents think they want and what they think
they will receive from the chief executive.208 Presidents protect their stakes of influence by the
choices they make, and the president with a sense of where power comes from is better positioned
to make choices that lead to further influence. As president, Barack Obama was quick to surround
himself with counsel that would allow him to consider problems from the perspective of his
counterparts on Capitol Hill. Consequently, the choices he made in pursuing healthcare reform were
more conducive to further influence. He recognized that reluctant members of Congress would
consider his reputation and public prestige when making decisions, and so Obama made choices to
maximize good will. To ask how a president can guard his persuasive capacity in choices he makes is
207
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to inquire how clearly he perceives, and Obama perceived that Congress would be more responsive
to his demands if he allowed leadership to take the reigns. He also enhanced his reputation by
bringing the healthcare industry into the fold, involving them in debate so as to construct legislation
acceptable to corporate interests.
While President Obama adhered to Neustadt’s advice to good effect, President Trump
spurned the same advice and suffered for it. Trump’s penchant for attacking those from whom he
demanded loyalty earned him a professional reputation that would doom his efforts to sway the few
holdouts he needed to persuade. Whereas Obama was an accommodating and reliable ally to the
leadership team tasked with delivering on his initiatives, Trump was stubborn and capricious. Both
presidents took a back seat in allowing majority party leadership to craft proposals that would pass,
but Trump frequently wavered in his support of his counterparts on the Hill. Coupled with his
attacks on Senator John McCain, the vote that would sink the American Health Care Act in the
Senate, it is easy to see how Trump’s inexperience and acts of choice hurt his persuasive capacity. In
order to emulate the success of his predecessor, President Trump would have done well to foster a
more positive professional reputation.
Richard Neustadt’s work is not the final word on the nature of presidential power. It is best
understood as a proto-theory to be tested and refined, a framework for understanding the qualia of a
president’s influence in government.209 Subsequent political development will invariably change the
ways in which the president and Congress interact, but the experiences of the Obama and Trump
administrations affirm the lasting validity of Neustadt’s arguments.
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The grandiosity of the presidential stage certainly invites the chief executive to seek political
power and authority so as to wield it over the other institutions of government.210 Expectation that a
president insert himself in the legislative process provides the sort of presidential energy Alexander
Hamilton so eloquently termed the “leading character in the definition of good government.”211 Yet
for all the benefits of a president acting in the dynamic, entrepreneurial fashion encouraged by
Neustadt, his approach does not distinguish between the use and abuse of presidential power.212
Looking at specific instances of presidents leaning on their persuasive capabilities is to lose sight of
the forest for the trees: modern presidents have steadily drawn power to themselves by virtue of
their enhanced visibility and through the use of unilateral executive action, regardless of the presence
or absence of Neustadtian characteristics conducive to presidential influence. Congress has
delegated extensive authority to the executive both explicitly through statute and implicitly by way of
inaction. For most new initiatives, the president leads and Congress follows.213 The modern
legislative presidency, though weak in some aspects, is augmented by a Congress unwilling and
unable to reclaim the authority vested in them by the Constitution. The growth of partisan rancor
and the deference granted to a president of one’s own party means that the interests of the men and
women in Congress are no longer connected with the constitutional rights of the place.214

Benjamin Kleinerman, “The Constitutional Ambitions of James Madison's Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 44,
no. 1 (March 2014), 7.
211
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist 70, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341.
212
Mitchel Sollenberger, “Presidential Studies, Behavioralism, and Public Law,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 4 4, no. 4
(December 2014), 762.
213
Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound ( New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 206.
214
James Madison, Federalist 51, ed. Terence Ball (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 252.
210

56
Bibliography

Abramowitz, Alan. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2010.
Abramson, Paul, John Aldrich, and David Rohde. Change and Continuity in the 2008 and 2010 Elections .
Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2012.
Baker, Peter. “Trump Tries to Regroup as the West Wing Battles Itself.” The New York Times. July
29, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/us/politics/trump-presidency-setbacks.html?smid=
tw-share&_r=0 .
Ball, Terence, ed. The Federalist: with Letters of Brutus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Beckmann, Matthew, and Vimal Kumar. “How Presidents Push, When Presidents Win: A Model of
Positive Presidential Power in US Lawmaking.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 23, no. 1 (2011):
3–20.
Béland, Daniel, Philip Rocco, and Alex Wadden. “Obamacare in the Trump Era: Where Are We
Now, and Where Are We Going?” Political Quarterly 89, no. 4 (October 2018): 687–94.

57
Berman, Russell. “The Shutdown Deal Is the Same One Trump Previously Rejected.” The Atlantic.
January 25, 2019.
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/01/shutdown-over-trump-relents/581
323/.
Blakel, John. “Obama's Victory Caps Struggles of Previous Generations.” CNN. November 5, 2008.
https://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/11/04/obama.history/index.html.

Bond, Jon. “Contemporary Presidency: Which Presidents Are Uncommonly Successful in Congress?
A Trump Update.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (December 2019): 898–908.
Budoff-Brown, Carrie. “Daschle: Anything but Clinton.” Politico. January 8, 2009.
https://www.politico.com/story/2009/01/daschle-anything-but-clinton-017206.
Bump, Philip. “Trump Insists That Senators (Who Won without Him) Owe Him Loyalty (That Isn’t
Returned).” The Washington Post. July 24, 2017.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/24/trump-insists-that-senat
ors-who-won-without-him-owe-him-loyalty-that-isnt-returned/ .
“Bush's Final Approval Rating: 22 Percent.” CBS News. January 16, 2009.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bushs-final-approval-rating-22-percent/.

58
Campbell, Colin, Bert Rockman, and Andrew Rudalevige, eds. The Obama Presidency: Appraisals and
Prospects. Washington, D.C: CQ Press, 2012

Carmines, Edward, and Matthew Fowler. “The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased
Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of
Presidential Power.” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 24, no. 2 (2017): 369–98.
Ceasar, James, Andrew Busch, and John Pitney. Defying the Odds: The 2016 Election and American
Politics. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.

Christenson, Dino, and Douglas Kriner. “Political Constraints on Unilateral Executive Action.” Case
Western Law Review 65, no. 4 (2015): 897–931.
Colvin, Jill, Lisa Mascaro, and Zeke Miller. “Longest Shutdown over: Trump Signs Bill to Reopen
Government.” The Associated Press, January 25, 2019.
https://apnews.com/30769167ab7a4ef9adf880d020b775dd.
Cronin, Thomas, and Michael Genovese. The Paradoxes of the American Presidency. 4th ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013.
Dickinson, Matthew. “We All Want a Revolution: Neustadt, New Institutionalism, and the Future of
Presidency Research.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 3 9, no. 4 (December 2009): 736–70.

59
Dickinson, Matthew, and Kate Reinmuth. “Trump, Congress, and Health Care: All Politics Is
National.” Forum 15, no. 3 (October 2017): 431–50.
Edsall, Thomas. “Killing Obamacare Softly.” The New York Times. July 27, 2017.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/27/opinion/health-care-obamacare.html.

Edwards, George. The Public Presidency. New York: St. Martins Press, 1979.
Edwards, George. On Deaf Ears. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2003.
Farnsworth, Stephen. Presidential Communication and Character: White House News Management from
Clinton and Cable to Twitter and Trump. New York: Routledge, 2018.
Frakes, Vincent. “Partisanship and (Un)Compromise: A Study of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act.” The Harvard Journal on Legislation 49, no. 1 (2012): 135–49.
Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson . “The Dog That Almost Barked: What the ACA Repeal Fight Says
about the Resilience of the American Welfare State.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 43,
no. 4 (August 2018): 551–77.
Hall, Andrew, and Kenneth Shepsle. "The Changing Value of Seniority in the U.S. House:
Conditional Party Government Revised." Journal of Politics 76, no. 1 (January 2014): 98-113.
Hawkins, Derek. “McCain: Trump Has Never Apologized for Saying He Was ‘Not a War Hero.’”
The Washington Post. September 25, 2017.

60
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/25/mccain-trump-has
-never-apologized-for-saying-he-was-not-a-war-hero/ .

Howell, William G. Power without Persuasion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Jacobson, Gary. “Donald Trump, the Public, and Congress: The First 7 Months.” Forum 15, no. 3
(October 2017): 525–45.

Jones, Charles. The Presidency in a Separated System. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2005.
Kaiser, Robert. Act of Congress. New York: Random House, 2013.
Kerbel, Matthew. Beyond Persuasion. New York: State University of New York Press, 1991.
Kernell, Samuel. Going Public. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.
Kleinerman, Benjamin. “The Constitutional Ambitions of James Madison's Presidency.” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 44, no. 1 (March 2014): 6–26.
Morone, James. “Health Policy and White Nationalism: Historical Lessons, Disruptive Populism,
and Two Parties at a Crossroads.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law 43, no. 4 (August
2018): 683–706.

61
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents. New York: Free Press, 1990.
“Obama Pushes Past Race Barriers, Wins White House.” NPR, November 5, 2008.
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96663807. .
Pérez-Peña, Richard. “Newspapers a Hot Commodity After Obama’s Win.” The New York Times.
November 5, 2008. https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/06/business/media/06paper.html.

Posner, Eric, and Adrian Vermeule. The Executive Unbound. New York: Oxford University Press,
2010.
Posner, Eric. “Presidential Leadership & the Separation of Powers.” Daedalus 145, no. 3 (2016):
35–43.
“Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress.” The White House, February 28, 2017.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-address-c
ongress/.

Rottinghaus, Brandon. “Exercising Unilateral Discretion: Presidential Justifications of Unilateral
Powers in a Shared Powers System.” American Politics Research 47, no. 1 (January 2019): 3–28.
Rudalevige, Andrew. “The Contemporary Presidency: The Decline and Resurgence and Decline
(and Resurgence?) of Congress: Charting a New Imperial Presidency.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 36, no. 1 (September 2006): 506–24.

62
Sanford, Sallie. “Nobody Knew How Complicated: Constraining The President’s Power to
(Re)Shape Health Reform.” American Journal of Law and Medicine 45, no. 2/3 (2019): 106–29.
Schier, Steven. Transforming America: Barack Obama in the White House. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2011.
Schier, Steven, and Todd Eberly. The Trump Presidency: Outsider in the Oval Office. Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2017.
Sollenberger, Mitchel. “Presidential Studies, Behavioralism, and Public Law.” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 2014): 758–78.

Thurber, James, ed. Rivals for Power. 5th ed. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013.
Thurber, James, ed. Obama in Office. New York: Routledge, 2016.
Wayne, Stephen J. The Legislative Presidency. New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
Wayne, Stephen. “Richard E. Neustadt as Teacher and Mentor: A Personal Reflection.” Presidential
Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 19–20.
Zelizer, Julian. The Presidency of Barack Obama. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
2018.

63

